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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of the Malaysian Syariah Advisory Council’s (SAC) 
decision on stock eligibility.  Specifically, we address four questions related to returns 
and trading volume of stocks in relation to the SAC’s decision to add or delete a stock to 
their list of halal stocks.  Overall, our findings suggest that inclusions experience a 
positive impact while deletions negative.  Our sample of 39 inclusions showed positive 
MCAR and increased trading volume.  The price impact however was delayed with 
significant positive MCARs in the 30 and 60 day window periods following 
announcement.  The impact on trading volume appears immediate but short lived.  Our 
Sample of 21 stocks deleted from SAC list experienced negative MCAR and reduced 
trading volume.  These were however statistically significant only in the 60 day window 
post announcement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The impact on a stock, of an addition to or deletion from a Stock Index has been of long 
interest to financial economists. The focus has been on two variables, changes in the 
stock’s returns and trading volume. While there appears to be evidence of an impact on 
both these variables, much of the debate has been on whether the impact is temporary or 
permanent and on the reasons for the impact. Alternative hypotheses/arguments have 
been put forth to explain the impact. Most such studies have been on developed country 
markets with the early pathbreaking studies; Harris and Gurel (1986) and Schleifer 
(1986) being US based studies on indices such as the S & P 500. 
 
Companies normally take the inclusion of their stock into an index, especially a popular 
and heavily tracked one, as a positive occurrence. At the very least, such an inclusion 
places their stock on the radar screen of analysts, investors and in particular, index fund 
managers. With a wider constituency of potential investors, trading volume improves, 
increasing the liquidity of their stocks and consequently reduced liquidity risk to their 
shareholders and possibly lower volatility. Furthermore, since inclusion is akin to an 
endorsement of the  stock as an investment component, the required risk premium 
should reduce. The implication of a reduced risk premium would be an enhanced stock 
price. 
 
The inclusion / deletion issue therefore is an important one for constituent stocks. This 
paper examines a similar issue but from a very different angle. We examine the impact 
of an addition to or deletion from the Malaysian Securities Commission’s index of Halal 
designated stocks. The determination of whether a stock is eligible for inclusion to the 
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list or deletion, is determined by the Securities Commission’s Syariah Advisory Council 
(SAC). The criteria used by the SAC is outlined in the next section. 
 
Though the SAC’s Islamic list is not an index in the sense of a conventional stock index 
it is a tradeable list and should have an impact similar to that of index additions/deletion. 
If anything, given the compulsory nature from a religious viewpoint, the impact should 
be even more prominent. This is because unlike additions / deletions to conventional 
indexes that may or may not lead to portfolio rebalancing, an exclusion from the SAC 
list automatically makes a stock ineligible for investment by Islamic funds. While an 
inclusion into the list may or may not attract new funds, 1 a deletion will require 
portfolio rebalancing by Islamic funds. In a sense therefore, the SAC decision being 
more binding from a religious viewpoint is likely to have a larger impact than the 
addition / deletion decision of a conventional stock index. The extent of the impact will 
be directly dependent on the aggregate size of Islamic funds relative to total market 
capitalisation. 
 
We examine this issue by way of addressing the following research questions; 
i) Does the inclusion of a stock into the SAC Shariah list have any impact 
on stock returns? 
 
ii) Is there any impact on trading volume? Is average trading volume any 
higher? 
 
iii) Does the deletion of a stock from the SAC Shariah list impact its returns/ 
price? 
 
iv) Does deletion have an impact on trading volume? Is the average volume 
any lower? 
                                                           
1
 The amount of new funds attracted to investing in the newly included stock will depend on the universe 
of available halal stocks and the available substitutes to the stock. 
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Aside from the need to understand these issues, the fact that there is no previous work in 
this area is what motivates this paper. The paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 
below provides an overview of the SAC’s decision criteria, and related issues. Section 3 
is a review of relevant literature. Section 4 outlines our data and methodology while 
Section 5 presents our results. The final section, Section 6, concludes.  
 
Section 2 : The Securities Commission & Syariah Advisory Council  
                   (SAC) 
 
The Securities Commission (SC) was set up on 1 March 1993.  The SC is a statutory 
body reporting to the Minister of Finance, it was established under the Securities 
Commission Act 1993. As the sole regulatory agency for the regulation and 
development of capital markets, it’s objective is to promote and maintain a fair, 
efficient, and transparent securities and futures markets and to facilitate the orderly 
development of an innovative and competitive capital market. 
 
The Syariah Advisory Council (SAC) was formally established on 16 May 1996. The 
SAC was formed to advise the SC on matters relating to the Islamic capital market and 
among its noteworthy initiatives were efforts to analyse and scrutinise products and 
issues such as call warrants, transferable subscription rights (TSR), asset securitisation, 
and bai’al-dayn. 
 
Specifically, the principal functions of the SAC would include the following: 
i) to advise the SC on the aims and operations of the Islamic capital market in order 
to ensure that they are consistent with Islamic principles; 
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ii) to provide an opportunity, and to expose jurists, scholars, intermediaries and 
investors, to Islamic financial products and Islamic jurispudence; 
 
iii) to ensure that activities in the securities and derivatives markets which are 
represented as Islamic would conform with syariah principles; and 
 
iv) to study matters related to Islamic capital market operations in response to 
requests for advice from industry, investors and the Government. 
 
 
2.1.0 : Stock Classification And Decision Criteria 
In classifying stocks as approved securities, the SAC has applied a standard criteria, that 
is, focusing on the core activities of the companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) and the Malaysia Exchange of Securities Dealing & Automated 
Quotation (MESDAQ). Hence, companies whose activities are not contrary to the 
Syariah principles will be classified as approved securities. 
 
Securities will be excluded from the list of approved securities based on the following 
criteria: 
(i) operations based on riba (interest) such as activities of financial institutions like 
commercial and merchant banks, finance companies etc; 
 
(ii) operations involving gambling; 
 
(iii) activities involving the manufacture and/or sale of haram (forbidden) products 
such as liquor, pork and meat not slaughtered according to Islam; and 
 
(iv) operations containing an element of gharar (uncertainty) such as the 
conventional insurance business. 
 
As for companies whose activities comprise both permissible and non-permissible 
elements, the Syariah Advisory Council (SAC) applies several additional criteria, this 
being: 
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(v) the core activities of the company must be of activities which are not against the 
syariah as outlined in the four criteria above. Furthermore the haram element 
must be very small compared to the core activities; 
 
(vi) the public perception or the image of the company must be good; and 
 
(vii) the core activities of the company have importance and maslahah (benefit in 
general) to the Muslim Ummah (nation) and the country, and the haram element 
is very small and involves matters such as 'umum balwa (common plight), 'uruf 
(custom) and the rights of the non-Muslim community which are accepted by 
Islam. 
 
Approved securities include ordinary shares, warrants and transferable subscription 
rights (TSR). This means that warrants and TSRs are classified as approved securities 
from the Syariah perspective provided the underlying shares are also approved. On the 
other hand, loan stocks and bonds are non-approved securities unless their issuance is 
based on Islamic principles. 
 
In classifying whether the securities are permissible or non permissible, the SAC goes 
through two phases of analysis that is Phase One: Quantitative Method and Phase Two: 
Qualitative Method. To analyse the securities SAC receives input and support from the 
SC. The SC gathers information about companies from various sources such as company 
annual financial reports, responses to a survey form which is issued to obtain detailed 
information and through inquiries made to the respective company's management.  
 
Phase One: Quantitative Method 
Phase One, is the calculation of percentage contribution of non permissible activities to 
company's income and profit before tax. There are three classifications of companies, 
that is, 100% permissible, 100% non permissible and mixed companies. Example of 
mixed companies, 97% permissible and 3% non permissible. 
 8
There are four steps involved in the analysis of mixed companies: 
Step 1: Get the earnings and the profit before tax of the whole company; 
Step 2: Get the earnings of non permissible activities and profit before tax of non 
permissible activities; 
Step 3: Divide and get the percentage of earnings of non permissible activities 
against the earnings of the whole company and also the percentage of profit 
before tax of non permissible against the profit before tax of the company; 
Step 4: Compare the percentage of non permissible activities in earnings with the 
profit using the level mark (see below). 
 
This level mark is used by the Syariah Advisory Council to determine whether the 
mixed company will be considered a permissible security or non-permissible security.  
 
There are two level mark categories: 
1) The level mark for non permissible activities is 5%. 
If the contribution (the earnings or profit) of non permissible activities are more 
than 5% of the earnings or profit before tax of the whole company, then the 
company will be excluded from the approved SAC List; 
 
2) The level mark for image (example hotel and resorts) is 25%. 
 If the contribution (the earnings or profit) of non permissible hotel's or resort's 
activities are more than 25% of the earnings or profit before tax of the whole 
company, then the company will be excluded. 
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Phase Two: Qualitative Method 
Phase Two is the public perception or the image of the company, whether the core 
activities of the company have importance and maslahah (benefit in general) to the 
Muslim Ummah (nation) and the country, and whether the haram element is small 
enough and involves matters such as 'umum balwa (common plight), 'uruf (custom) and 
the rights of the non-Muslim community which is accepted by Islam. The analysis is 
done on a case by case basis. 
 
The study of companies is done by taking into consideration the above, quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Each company is reviewed based on its last financial report. On 
completion of these evaluation, a list of approved securities by the Syariah Advisory 
Council will be released. The list is updated usually on a interval  4 month. 
 
Section 3 : Literature Review 
While it is well documented that an inclusion of a stock into an index generally results in 
a statistically significant increase in both price and volume, the cause of these effects 
have been debated. There appears to be three hypotheses that have been put forth to 
explain the cause of these effects. By way of importance, these are i) The Price-Pressure 
hypothesis ii) Liquidity hypothesis and iii) Information hypothesis. The price-pressure 
hypothesis argues that an inclusion/deletion decision would be followed by portfolio 
rebalancing on the part of index funds, thereby leading to upward price pressure for 
inclusions and downward pressures for deletions. Going by the rebalancing argument, 
the implication is that the price and volume changes would likely be temporary, since 
institutional buying and selling pressures should abate following rebalancing. The 
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liquidity hypothesis argues that following an inclusion, the stock comes under closer 
scrutiny of institutional investors and analysts leading to increased public information on 
the stock. The stock becomes more liquid, has lower bid-ask spreads and lower required 
returns following reduced risk-premium. The result being an increase in price reflecting 
the reduced risk premium. The information hypothesis argues that the inclusion of a 
stock into the index “certifies the quality of the company and thus entails a price 
increase”. 2 Shleifer (1986) argues that the price increase upon S&P 500 addition is 
permanent and driven by increased demand in the presence of downward sloping 
demand curves.  He finds that, since September 1976, stocks newly included into the 
Standard and Poor's 500 Index have earned a significant positive abnormal return at the 
announcement of the inclusion. This return does not disappear for at least ten days after 
the inclusion. The returns are positively related to measures of buying by index funds, 
consistent with the hypothesis that the demand curve for stocks is downward sloping.  
 
In contrast, Harris and Gurel (1986) find a permanent increase in volume but only a 
temporary increase in price, this they argue derives from temporary price pressure by 
index funds. The study was done on all changes in the S & P 500 list for the period 1973 
- 1983. The results show that immediately after an addition is announced, price increases 
by more than 3 percent. This increase however, is nearly fully reversed after 2 weeks.  
 
Upinder Dhillon and Herb Johnson (1991),  find a permanent increase in both price and 
volume which they attribute to informational efficiencies, such efficiencies, they argue, 
may have been enhanced by the introduction of S & P 500 Index futures and options 
                                                           
2
 See – Andrei Schleifer (1986) 
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contracts in 1983.  They studied the changes in the S & P 500 index over the period 
1978 to 1988. 
  
More recently, Gayle and Miller (1998), examined changes in stock liquidity, as 
measured by the bid/ask price, when a stock is added to the S&P 500 Index. The study 
presents evidence of a significant decrease in the bid/ask spread upon S&P 500 addition.  
However, this effect is limited to only those stocks that were not trading listed options. 
Further, the decrease in the bid/ask spread for nonoptioned stocks is accompanied by a 
significant and permanent increase in share price and trading volume. Optioned stocks 
experienced a permanent increase in trading volume.  
 
Beneish and Gardner (1995) examine the DJIA listing. Unlike the S & P 500 studies, 
they find no evidence of impact on price nor trading volume for inclusions to the DJIA. 
They attribute this to a lack of portfolio rebalancing since most US index funds track the 
broader based S & P 500. They do however find that stocks removed from the index 
experience significant price declines. 
 
While the studies of Schleifer (1986) and Harris and Gurel (1986) present evidence in 
support of the price-pressure hypothesis, Gayle & Miller (1998) show evidence 
supporting the liquidity hypothesis. Finally, the fact that Beneish and Gardner (995) find 
significant price declines for firms removed from the DJIA implies support for the 
information hypothesis. 
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Section 4 : Data and Methodology 
 
In addressing our four research questions on the impact on returns and volume of an 
addition/deletion to the SAC list, we use the standard event study methodology. As the 
announcement date is the event date, we begin with identifying announcement dates. 
Over our three year sample period 1997 to end 1999, the SAC had made 7 public 
announcements over an approximate 4 month intervals. The dates and number of 
approved securities is shown in table 1 below; 
TABLE 1 
Date and Number of Approved Shares by the Syariah Advisory Council (SAC) 
Announcement 
Date 
No. of Approved 
Shares 
Total of 
Shares in 
Stock Mkt 
Percentage of approved 
securities to total Mkt (%) 
 
18 June 1997 371 651 57 
23 December 1997 476 680 70 
4 May 1998 531 728 73 
9 September 1998 542 730 74 
4 January 1999 543 736 74 
12 May 1999 541 739 73 
22 September 1999 545 746 73 
 
Source: Updated lists of approved Securities by the Securities Commission's Syariah Advisory 
Council 
 
The June 18, 1997 announcement was the first classification by the SAC following its 
establishment in May 1996. A total of 371 securities were approved, this was followed 
by the December 1997 announcement adding a further 106 stocks. Following these two 
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large inclusions, subsequent updates have much smaller net inclusions.3  Ignoring the 
first two announcements, which we consider to be really a building up of the halal list, 
we concentrate on the subsequent 5 announcements.  The breakdown of inclusions and 
deletions for each of the five announcements is shown in Table 2, below: 
TABLE 2 
SAC Announcement Dates And Breakdown of Additions/Deletions 
 
 
Announcement 
Date 
 
Listed  
Board  
 
Stocks 
Added 
 
Stocks  
Deleted 
 
4, May 1998 
 
Main Board 
Second Board 
 
13 
47 
 
4 
2 
 
9, Sept 1998 
 
Main Board 
Second Board 
 
5 
9 
 
2 
0 
 
4, Jan 1999 
 
Main Board 
Second Board 
 
1 
5 
 
2 
3 
 
12, May 1999 
 
Main Board 
Second Board 
 
2 
2 
 
5 
1 
 
22, Sept 1999 
 
Main Board 
Second Board 
 
8 
5 
 
9 
0 
 
Total 
 
Main Board 
Second Board 
 
29 
68 
 
22 
6 
 
Over the 5 announcements, a total of 97 stocks were included, (68 Second Board, 29 
Main Board) and 28 deleted.  Of these, owing to the lack of data and other inadequacies 
particularly with the second board stocks, we examine a total of 39 stocks that were 
added and 21 stocks that were deleted from the SAC list.  Our list of the 60 sample 
stocks is shown in Table A1,  in Appendix. 
                                                           
3
 In fact there was a small net reduction in approved stocks between the January and May 1999  
announcements. 
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4.1 : Impact on Returns 
In  examining the impact on returns of an addition or deletion we examine daily prices 
for a + 120 day period around announcement day 4.   The expected return for each stock:  
^ 
Rit, is determined by regressing the daily returns over the 240 days as; 
 
………….. (1) 
Where ; 
              ^ 
              Ri     =  expected returns of stock  i  on day t. 
 
   Rmt = returns on the market (KLCI) on day t.5 
The percentage Daily actual returns for each stock is completed as; 
       ………. (2) 
 
Using (1) and (2) ; the daily abnormal return ARit is determined as; 
                            …………  (3) 
 
Next the Cummulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for a specific window period is 
determined as; 
         …………… (4) 
                                                           
4
 The total 240 days would represent approximately on e calendar year of trading days ; i.e aproximately 6 
months before and after announcement. 
5
 Rmt is computed as %∆ in daily returns. 
∑
=
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Finally, we aggregate across all our 39 sample additions and separately for the 21 
deletions to arrive at the Mean Cummulative Abnormal Returns (MCAR) as: 
       ………… (5) 
Where, MCART is the Mean Cummulative Abnormal Returns for a selected window 
period T. 
 
To test for statistical significance, we use two tests, the parametric Z-test, and a non 
parametric Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Matched Pairs test. Using the Z test, we test the 
hypothesis that MCART = O for a specific window period following announcement. The 
window periods being +60 days,  +30 days and +10 days. In using the Wilcoxon test, we 
test the hypothesis that MCART  for a specific window period before and after the 
announcement date are the same. Here the window periods are + 60 days, + 30 days and 
+ 10 days. 
 
4.2 : Impact on Trading Volume 
In determining the impact of the SAC’s decision on a stock’s trading volume we 
examine the mean aggregated daily trading volume. This is done first across all our 
sample of additions and then separately for deletions. Mean daily trading volume 
aggregated for sample additions and deletions for a specific window period T, is 
computed as; 
      …………. (6) 
    
NCARMCAR
N
T
ITT /
1
∑
=
=
NVMDVA
N
t
itT 





= ∑
=1
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       Where; Vit = trading volume for stock i on day t. 
                      N = total number of stocks. (39 for additions and 21 for deletions) 
Again the parametric Z  test and non-parametric Wilcoxon test is used. We test the 
hypothesis that mean volume in the window period before and after is equal. 
 
Section 5 : Results & Analysis  
5.1 Impact on Returns ; Additions 
Tables A2 and A3 in appendix show the results of our parametric and non parametric 
tests. Table A2 shows the Z test results for the three post announcement windows. The 
MCAR and Z values for the corresponding pre-announcement window periods are also 
shown for comparison. Recall that our Z test was to test the hypothesis that MCAR for 
the specified window period = O. Of the three post announcement  windows, the 10 day 
period immediately following announcement of inclusion shows no different MCAR. 
However, both the +30 day and +60 day windows show significantly higher MCAR at 
both the 5% and 10% levels. Comparison of the MCAR for both the +60 and +30 day 
windows with the corresponding pre announcement period shows substantially higher 
MCAR post announcement .These results imply that while an inclusion into the SAC list 
of halal stocks has a positive impact on stock prices, the price increase is not immediate. 
This is clearly borne out in Fig.1 which shows the plot of daily MCAR for the + 120 day 
period. The positive price reaction really begins from about day +20 and shows a 
consistent increase until approximately day +80. Thus, it is no surprise that our test of 
the +10 day window shows no change in MCAR but the +30 and +60 day windows do. 
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Results of the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test comparing MCAR before and after 
announcement for a window period confirms these results. The MCAR in the post 
announcement window is significantly higher for both the +60 and +30 day windows. 
As in the earlier test the +10 day window shows no statistical difference. 
 
5.2: Impact on Returns: Deletions 
 
Tables A4 & A5 show our test results for stocks that were deleted from the  SAC halal 
list. Based on both the Z, and Wilcoxon test results, it appears that while there is indeed 
a negative impact, the price reduction is not immediate. The MCAR for all three post 
announcement window periods is negative, implying a decline in prices following 
announcement, however, only the +60 window is significantly so. Both the +10 and +30  
windows though negative, are not significant at either the 5% of 10% level. Fig. 3 shows 
the daily plot of MCAR for deletions for the +120 day period. No visible trend is evident 
for the first 30 day period following announcement, though much volatility is evident. It 
is in the period approximately after day +40 that we do see a declining trend which 
bottoms out around day +80. Based on this plot of daily MCAR, our test results of no 
significance for the +10 and +30 day periods is consistent. 
 
5.3: Impact on Volume: (Additions) 
 
The results of our test of the impact on trading volume of stocks added to the SAC list is 
produced in Tables A6 and A7 in appendix.  Table A6 shows the result of our Z test of 
the hypothesis that there is no change in trading volume for a given pre and post 
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announcement period window. Two features are noticeable. First, the aggregated mean  
daily trading volume (MDVA) is higher for all three post announcement windows +60, 
+30 and +10 relative to its respective pre-announcement window. This clearly implies a 
positive impact, higher mean daily volumes. However, only the +10 day window is 
significantly so. The non parametric Wilcoxon test shows similar results. Both the + 60 
days and +30 day windows have rankings more or less split evenly and are insignificant. 
However, for the +10 day window, 9 of the 10 days pre announcement had lower 
MDVA relative to its post announcement match. 
 
5.4: Impact on Volume : (Deletions) 
Appendix Tables A8 and A9 show the results of our test of volume impact for deletions. 
Based on Table A8 of the Z test, it appears that deletions do result in reduced mean daily 
volumes. Notice that the MDVA for each of the post announcement window, +60, +30, 
+10 are all lower relative to its respective pre announcement window. Deletions from 
the SAC list do appear to have a negative impact on volume. However, only the +60 day 
window has statistical significance. This implies that while there is a negative impact on 
volume, the impact is delayed and not immediate. The Wilcoxon test results shown in 
Table A9 are consistent with this. Except for the +60 day window which is significant at 
both the 5% and 10% levels, the other two window periods show no statistical difference 
in volume pre and post announcement. 
 
5.5 : Analysis of Results 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Overall, based on the above results, our findings appear to be largely consistent with 
what one would expect. Inclusions appear to have a positive impact while deletions 
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negative . For our sample of 39 inclusions, we find a positive impact on both stock 
prices (MCAR) and volume as measured by MDVA. However, whereas the price impact 
is gradual, with significant increases post 30 and 60 days, the volume effect appears to 
be immediate though temporary. Trading volume is significantly higher only in the +10 
day window. 
 
Deletions on the other hand had a negative impact on both stock returns/prices and 
trading volume. However, whereas the timing was mixed in the case of inclusions, with 
prices reacting later but volume immediately, in the case of deletions, we see a delayed 
impact in both prices and trading volume. Our sample of 21 deletions had significantly 
lower volumes and negative MCAR only in the 60 day window. The shorter term 
windows has means that were consistent 6 but not statistically significant. 
 
That inclusions result in positive MCARs whereas exclusions in negative ones is to be 
expected. Inclusion into the SAC list is “official” endorsement that the stock is indeed 
halal. Such an endorsement automatically expands the range of potential investors for 
the stock. All Islamic mutual funds, Treasury departments of Islamic Institutions and 
individual Muslim investors now become potential investors of the stock as a result of 
its qualification as a halal stock. Deletions on the other hand should have the opposite 
effect. All Islamic investment money would avoid the stock and existing Muslim 
holders, sell the stock. Given reduced demand, the impact on price is negative. 
 
                                                           
6
 Lower trading volume and negative MCAR 
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While this is consistent, the price impact to both inclusions and deletions is delayed; i.e 
price adjustment is not immediate. At first glance, this may appear to be a surprising 
result; particularly in the context of deletions. A stock deemed non-halal would be 
expected to be immediately sold. We believe the delayed impact on prices for both 
inclusions and deletions has to do with gradual portfolio rebalancing. In the case of 
newly included stocks, portfolio rebalancing need not be immediate if there already 
exists a sufficiently large  universe of eligible investable stocks. This is indeed the case 
in Malaysia. Even our earliest event date, May 19987 had 476 available halal stocks, 
approximately 70 % of all Malaysian stocks. Given that fund managers could be 
sufficiently well diversified with the existing stocks there is no need for quick inclusion 
of additional stocks. 
 
That stocks deemed non-halal and deleted are not subject to immediate price pressure 
may appear surprising. However, in the light of the SAC’s ruling on the matter, gradual 
portfolio rebalancing is logical. The SAC advises that Islamic funds and investors can 
continue holding a deleted stock until they can recover at least its original cost or 
breakeven on the investment. In other words, immediate sale of a deleted stock is not 
necessary. 
 
 
 
                                                           
7
 see; Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 21 
Section 6 : Conclusion 
This paper examined the impact of the Malaysian Syariah Advisory Council’s (SAC) 
decision on stock eligibility. Specifically, we addressed four questions related to returns 
and trading volume of stocks in relation to the SAC’s decision to add or delete a stock to 
their list of halal stocks. Overall, our findings suggest that inclusions experience a 
positive impact while deletions negative. Our sample of 39 inclusions experienced   
positive MCAR and increased trading volume. The price impact however was delayed 
with significant positive MCARs in the 30 and 60 day periods following announcement. 
The impact on trading volume appears immediate but short lived. Stocks deleted from 
SAC the list, experienced negative MCAR and reduced trading volume. These were 
however statistically significant only in the 60 day window post announcement. 
 
In terms of previous research, our findings appear most consistent with the Information 
hypothesis. Though in conventional terms, the Information hypothesis argues that 
inclusion into a index “certifies the quality of the company and thus entails a price 
increase”, in our context inclusion implies certification as halal. Thus, a even more 
powerful endorsement. Even though the price impact implies portfolio rebalancing by 
Islamic funds, the Price Pressure Hypothesis  predicts a more immediate and temporary 
price reaction than what our results show. 
 
In addition to the three commonly cited hypotheses; Price-Pressure, Liquidity and 
Information hypotheses, Schleifer (1986) proposes another possible explanation; Market 
Segmentation. This argues that certain types of investors are only interested in stocks 
included in an index such as the S & P 500. As such , inclusion would attract these 
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investors and result in price and volume increases. Though the Market Segmentation 
argument has not had much attention in the conventional index research,  we believe it 
makes a strong case where Islamic investing and halal stocks are concerned. By 
definition, Islamic funds and strictly islamic individual investors would only be 
interested in stocks included in the halal list. This would imply positive price and 
volume reaction to inclusion and a negative price/volume reaction to a deletion. An 
implication broadly consistent with our findings. 
 
Islamic funds in Malaysia, despite very impressive recent growth remain a small niche. 
Relative to overall market capitalisation the total Net Asset Value of the 13 available 
Islamic funds is less than 5 %.   This of course ignores individual Muslim investors who 
may be reliant on the SAC list for their investment decisions. The possibility of non-
muslim investors using the halal list to identify “ethical stocks” cannot be excluded. 
Thus further research over a longer time span should be useful. 
 
One final implication of our findings from a stock issuing company viewpoint is that, it 
may be worthwhile for a company to get its stock on the SAC list, and ensure it remains 
there. 
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TABLE A2 
Price Effect For All Additions (39 Stocks) 
(Parametric Z test) 
 
Window 
Period 
 
MCAR 
 
Z 
Value 
 
Significant 
(sig/Insignificant 
(insig) 
 
 
Remarks 
 
 
 
At  5% 
 
At 10% 
 
- 60 days 
 
2.5183 
 
0.7557 
 
Insig 
 
Insig 
 
No abnormal return 
 
 
+ 60 days 
 
14.5861 
 
10.7986 
 
Sig 
 
Sig 
 
Price increase, higher MCAR 
post announce. 
 
 
- 30 days 
 
-0.2820 
 
-0.1128 
 
Insig 
 
Insig 
 
No abnormal return 
 
 
+ 30 days 
 
7.3606 
 
10.9704 
 
Sig 
 
Sig 
 
Price increase, higher MCAR 
post announce. 
 
 
- 10 days 
 
0.0832 
 
0.0680 
 
Insig 
 
Insig 
 
No abnormal return 
 
 
+ 10 days 
 
-0.7470 
 
-0.4974 
 
Insig 
 
Insig 
 
No abnormal return 
 
 
 
Table A3 
Price Effect For All Additions 
(Non Para; Wilcoxon Z-Test) 
 
 
Window Period 
 
Wilcoxon Z- Value 
 
Asymp. Sig. (Prob) 
 
Remarks 
 
 
± 60 days 
 
-5.941 
 
.000** 
MCAR higher post 
announcement 
 
± 30 days 
 
-4.288 
 
.000** 
MCAR higher post 
announcement 
 
± 10 days 
 
-.357 
 
.721 
 
No dif. in MCAR 
 
** Sig. at both 5% and 10% 
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TABLE A4 
Price Effect For All Deletions  (21 Stocks) 
(Parametric Z test) 
 
Window 
Period 
 
MCAR 
 
Z 
 
 
Significant 
(sig/Insignificant 
(insig) 
 
 
Remarks 
 
 
 
At  5% 
 
At 10% 
 
- 60 days 
 
2.3008 
 
2.6977 
 
Sig 
 
Sig 
 
Price increase, positive 
returns 
 
 
+ 60 days 
 
-1.6309 
 
-2.8901 
 
Sig 
 
Sig 
 
Price decrease negative 
MCAR post announce 
 
 
- 30 days 
 
0.9269 
 
0.7331 
 
Insig 
 
Insig 
 
No abnormal return 
 
 
+ 30 days 
 
-0.6794 
 
-1.6231 
 
Insig 
 
Insig 
 
No abnormal return 
 
 
- 10 days 
 
0.6010  
 
0.4406 
 
Insig 
 
Insig 
 
 
No abnormal return 
 
 
+ 10 days 
 
-0.2427 
 
-0.6397 
 
Insig 
 
Insig 
 
No abnormal return 
 
 
Table A5 
Price Effect For All Deletions 
(Non Para; Wilcoxon Z-Test) 
 
 
Window Period 
 
Wilcoxon Z- Value 
 
Asymp. Sig. (Prob) 
 
Remarks 
 
 
± 60 days 
 
-3.180 
 
.001** 
 
MCAR lower post 
announcement 
 
± 30 days 
 
-1.224 
 
.221 
 
No. dif. in MCAR 
 
± 10 days 
 
-.866 
 
.386 
 
No dif. in MCAR 
 
** Sig. at both 5% and 10% 
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Table A6 
Volume Effect For All Inclusions (39 stocks) 
(Parametric Z – test ) 
 
Window 
Period 
 
Mean Daily 
Agg. Volume 
 
Z 
 
Significant (sig)/Insignificant 
(insig) 
At 5%          At 10% 
 
Remarks 
 
- 60 days 
 
175251.54 
    
 
+ 60 days 
 
178235.09 
    
 
± 60 days 
  
-0.1880 
 
Insig 
 
Insig 
 
No Change in volume 
 
-30 days 
 
142031.71 
    
 
+30 days 
 
152984.53 
    
 
± 30 days 
  
-0.9440 
 
Insig 
 
Insig 
 
No Change in volume 
 
-10 days 
 
131714.36 
    
 
+10 days 
 
197122.31 
    
 
± 10 days 
  
-5.4489 
 
Sig 
 
Sig 
 
Increase in volume 
post announcement 
 
Table A7 
Volume Effect For All Additions 
(Non Para; Wilcoxon Z-Test) 
 
 
Window Period 
 
Wilcoxon Z- Value 
 
Asymp. Sig. (Prob) 
 
Remarks 
 
 
± 60 days 
 
-.464 
 
.643 
 
No. dif. in volume 
 
± 30 days 
 
-.689 
 
.491 
 
No. dif. in volume 
 
± 10 days 
 
-2.191 
 
.028** 
 
Increase in volume post 
announce 
 
** Sig. at both 5% and 10% 
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Table A8 
Volume Effect For All Deletions 
(Parametric Z – test ) 
 
Window 
Period 
 
Mean Daily 
Agg. Volume 
 
Z 
 
Significant (sig)/Insignificant 
(insig) 
At 5%          At 10% 
 
Remarks 
 
- 60 days 
 
1033373.55 
    
 
+ 60 days 
 
746411.41 
    
 
± 60 days 
 
 
 
3.8507 
 
Sig 
 
Sig 
 
Volume lower post 
announce 
 
-30 days 
 
814609.48 
    
 
+30 days 
 
72587.40 
    
 
± 30 days 
  
1.2669 
 
Insig 
 
Insig 
 
No change in volume 
 
-10 days 
 
1009173.66 
    
 
+10 days 
 
901197.45 
    
 
± 10 days 
  
1.1622 
 
Insig 
 
Insig 
 
No change in volume 
 
 
Table A9 
Volume Effect For All Deletions 
(Non Para; Wilcoxon Z-Test) 
 
 
Window Period 
 
Wilcoxon Z- Value 
 
Asymp. Sig. (Prob) 
 
Remarks 
 
 
± 60 days 
 
-3.813 
 
.000** 
 
Volume lower post 
announce 
 
± 30 days 
 
-.668 
 
.504 
 
No change  in volume 
 
± 10 days 
 
-.051 
 
.959 
 
No  change in volume 
 
** Sig. at both 5% and 10% 
 
 
